And that is how you make peace with people who hate you, want to kill, and don;t acknowledge your right to exist. You make it not worth it for them to do so. Ideally, as with the U.S. nuclear build up with the Soviet Union, simply the threat is sufficient and no one has to get hurt. Nor is violence necessarily effective, or necessary. the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam did not, in fact, tumble the rest of South East Asia (and the world) like dominoes. Nor did the U.S. win in Iraq by "shock and awe." Figuring out the proper level of deterrence and incentive is tricky, and guessing wrong can have profoundly bad consequences. But, to be blunt, it's not like you can opt not to play.
And yes, Hamas makes the same calculations. that's what the occasional Hudna offer is all about. 'Lets stop killing each other for awhile so we can rest up and come back and kill each other later when I have a clear advantage." Israel usually rejects these out of hand, which I suppose made sense when Israel clearly had the upper hand. The usual justification is that hudna isn't really peace and is offered only to gain advantage. To which I can only say duh! That's rather the whole point of a cease fire. the question is not if your opponent is sincere -- he just friggin' told you this was just a cease fire for purposes of resting up to rearm and prepare -- the question is whether it likewise offers advantages to your side. One possible advantage is ensuring that the other side never feels so secure in its position that it starts up again. And while that risks losing an existing advantage, it also creates possibilities for something much more extended. China and Taiwan have been in a state of hudna for about 60 years now.
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